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Abstract
Purpose – This research analyzes to what extent committing resources 
to the internationalization of family business groups is related to the 
institutional distance of the host country.
Design/methodology/approach – We used OLS panel data with 
fixed effects. 
Findings – We identified that family business groups decide to 
internationalize themselves committing fewer resources to countries 
that present a positive institutional distance, and that are more 
institutionally developed than the country of origin. On the other hand, 
when family business groups choose to expand abroad committing more 
resources, they tend to invest in countries with a negative institutional 
distance, and that are less institutionally developed than the country 
of origin.
Originality/value – Our main contribution to existing theory on 
internationalization of family business groups is to test the relationship 
between the level of resource commitment by family business groups 
in their international expansion and the institutional distance between 
the country of origin and the host country.
Keywords – Family business groups; internationalization; resource 
commitment; institutional distance.
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1	 Introduction
This article analyzes to what extent the 
commitment of resources in the internationalization 
process of a family business group is associated to 
the host country’s institutional distance. Previous 
studies indicated a number of advantages and 
disadvantages in the internationalization of family 
business groups. Among the disadvantages is 
the fact that family business groups have rooted 
within their affiliates institutional characteristics 
that are specific to their home country, thus 
hindering their adaptation when there is 
internationalization to countries with different 
institutional characteristics  (Pedersen & Stucchi, 
2015). Regarding advantages, we can highlight 
the fact that being affiliated to a group is a way 
of overcoming institutional weaknesses such as 
fragile regulations, breakdowns in infrastructure 
and a failure to fulfill contracts. Group-affiliated 
firms benefit from financial support and from 
information for the internationalization process, 
while also making use of family business groups’ 
influence on the government of the country of 
origin (Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998; Yaprak & 
Karademir, 2010). Furthermore, there is evidence 
that family business groups internationalize more 
quickly than non-affiliated firms, expanding to 
a higher number of countries, and their entry 
generally involves greater resources (Yaprak & 
Karademir, 2010). However, there is a lack of 
definitive evidence concerning the decision-
making process regarding resource commitment, 
or whether this decision is associated to the 
institutional level of the host country, since 
institutions play a relevant role in the establishment 
and development of family business groups. 
As such, this article seeks to contribute to 
existing theory on the internationalization of 
family business groups, testing if the choice for 
greater or lesser resource commitment in the 
internationalization of affiliated firms is associated 
to the institutional distance between the country 
of origin and the host country. 
Considering that the development of 
firms depends on the business environment to 
which they belong (Williamson, 1981), we can 
understand the growth of family business groups 
from an institutional perspective. In order to 
reduce transactions costs in markets with weak 
institutions, groups diversify and integrate 
vertically. As well as performing transactions 
amongst themselves, these integrated firms are 
able to overcome fragile institutional contexts 
by doing so (Khanna & Palepu, 1997, 1999; 
Yiu, Lu, Bruton, & Hoskisson, 2007). Thus, 
the creation of this intragroup market provides 
support to affiliated firms during their expansion 
into different countries, regardless of their 
institutional distances. The term “institutional 
distance” designates a difference or similarity 
between home and host countries in terms of 
institutional environments (Kostova, 1999). 
Measuring institutional difference is important to 
understanding the type of entry mode strategies 
that can be matched to such distance, so as to 
ensure firms abroad have a competitive edge 
(Hernandez & Nieto, 2015). 
For this analysis, we used Brazil as the 
research sample. Brazil was chosen due to 
its expressive representativeness in terms of 
family business groups; the 200 biggest groups 
represented 52.6% of the Gross Domestic 
Product in 2012. Also, being a country with 
weak institutions, family business groups use this 
“disadvantage” to grow and diversify. Moreover, 
Brazil holds an average ranking position according 
to the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), 
which increases the possibility of its comparison 
with other nations on that list. As such, the 
annual ranking from Valor 200 Grandes Grupos 
was used to compose a sample of 38 groups 
with international operations. Using these 38 
family business groups as a starting point, about 
500 affiliated firms were located abroad. These 
subsidiaries were used in a hypothesis test through 
panel data and fixed effects regression. 
Results show that decisions by family 
business groups, in terms of resource commitment 
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to internationalize, are associated to the 
institutional distance of the host country. Based 
on the assumption that the degree of resource 
commitment comes prior to the choice of a 
host country, family business groups tend to 
internationalize with less resource commitment 
– herein considered a commercial office – to 
countries that are more developed than the 
home country. However, when they choose to 
internationalize with higher resource commitment 
– in this study referring to a manufacturing plant 
– family business groups choose countries that are 
less developed than their home countries. 
2	 Theoretical foundation
2.1	Family Business Groups 
Family business groups are a specific 
organizational form (Khanna; Yafeh, 2007) and, 
despite being part of developed markets, as is the 
case of Italy and Sweden (Chang, 2006; Khanna 
& Yafeh, 2007), they dominate private sector 
activities in the majority of emerging markets 
around the world (Khanna & Palepu, 2000a). 
These groups are given different names in different 
countries. In South Korea, for example, they 
are called cheabols; in Japan, keiretsu; in South 
America, grupos económicos; and, in Russia, 
oligarchs (Granovetter, 1994). So far, there is no 
clear consensus in literature about the definition 
of family business groups (Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2006; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001). Definitions 
vary from country to country, but the most usual 
definitions are the following: (i) in a broader 
approach adopted by Sociology, business groups 
are a series of firms that are formally or informally 
connected to each other (Granovetter, 1994); (ii) 
the other approach, referring to Economics, is 
more specific and suggests that family business 
groups are a collection of formally independent 
firms, although their administrative and financial 
aspects are often jointly controlled, and often 
by a family (Chang & Hong, 2002). Lastly, the 
definition used in this article is the one suggested 
by Ghemawat and Khanna (1998) and Khanna 
and Palepu (1997), in which business groups are 
legally independent firms, under family control, 
that operate through a range of industries and, 
mostly in emerging markets (Ghemawat & 
Khanna, 1998; Khanna & Palepu, 1997). 
In regards to organizational structure, 
family business groups vary greatly. Some are 
diversified, while others are more vertically 
integrated (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007). According 
to Schneider (2009), family business groups 
diversify so as to improve economic return 
through an economy of scope and also to reduce 
the risk of managerial volatility. For example, 
the average of sectors to which Chilean groups 
belong is around 5.6. In India, they belong to 
4.2 sectors, and, in the Philippines, 3.5 sectors 
(Khanna & Yafeh, 2007). Additionally, a recent 
study showed that, in Brazil, diversification of 
family business groups is at around 4 sectors per 
group (Costa, Bandeira-de-Mello, & Marcon, 
2013). Concerning vertical integration, there are 
groups that belong to different and correlated 
industries. For example, family business groups 
that operate in the agricultural sector have an 
office that trades agricultural products. Vertical 
integration also varies among countries. For 
example, Philippine groups are more vertical than 
Indian groups, which, in turn, are more vertical 
that Mexican groups (Khanna & Yafeh, 2007). 
In respect to ownership and control, there are 
vertically controlled groups – pyramidal, and 
the horizontally controlled (Khanna & Yafeh, 
2007). Essentially, family business groups are 
pyramidal (La Porta, Lopez-de-silanes, & Shleifer, 
1999; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988; Morck 
& Yeung, 2003) and, by means of the pyramid 
structure, the firm directly and indirectly controls 
the affiliated firms. Through this, families always 
control the vote in all group firms, even when 
they do not necessarily own them (Morck & 
Yeung, 2003). 
It is possible to understand the expansion 
of family business groups through  Transaction 
Cost Theory (Williamson, 1981). This theory 
suggests that development of the firm depends 
330
Review of Business Management., São Paulo, Vol. 18, No. 61, p. 327-347,  Jul./Sept. 2016
Marina A. B Gama / Jeferson Lana / Cyntia Calixto / Rodrigo Bandeira-de-Mello
on the institutional environment in which it 
is inserted. When institutional failure occurs, 
a transaction economically profitable to both 
parts is not established, since the costs of each 
transaction outweigh the benefits (Williamson, 
1981). Transaction costs are high because rules 
are not followed; there are imperfect contracts 
and legislations, when compared to transactions 
costs in developed countries (Khanna & Palepu, 
1997; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001). For example, 
in emerging markets, the financial sector is 
characterized by limited transparency, weak 
corporate governance, and control. Financial 
funds, business analysts and venture capital, the 
intermediaries, are not always involved in the 
processes. Moreover, regulation has not been fully 
developed or is not strong enough to ensure that 
rules are obeyed (Khanna & Palepu, 2000a).
As proposed in the definition, business 
groups are normally family-ruled and usually 
developed in markets with high transaction 
costs (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000). 
A reduction of transaction costs is possible due 
to the fact that groups diversify, so they can do 
better business among the group-affiliated firms 
and overcome the fragile institutional context 
(Khanna & Palepu, 1997, 1999; Yiu et al., 
2007). As a result of the previously presented 
weak conjectures and internal transactions, family 
business groups create capital, production and 
work markets within the group. For example, 
many family groups have their own banks, 
performing transactions with affiliated firms, as 
Banco Original, part of Grupo JHS&F, or Banco 
Moneo, part of Marcopolo. Another example is 
uncovered in the job market, in which groups 
seek to exchange their professionals among 
the different affiliated firms, instead of hiring 
someone from the market. In this sense, Hyundai 
business group developed a technical training 
process and a research institute to be used by all 
group-affiliated firms, thereby permitting the use 
of the same professional in different group firms 
(Khanna & Yafeh, 2007). 
The establishment of an internal market, 
within the family business group, provides 
support to affiliate firms, both in their expansion 
in the domestic market, described in the 
previous paragraph, and in terms of international 
expansion. Regarding the international expansion, 
there are both disadvantages and advantages 
associated to group-affiliated firms (Pedersen 
& Stucchi, 2015; Yaprak & Karademir, 2010). 
The disadvantages are related to the fact that 
the group carries deeply rooted traits that are 
specific to their home country. Affiliated firms 
incorporate the characteristics of emerging 
markets (wherein groups are more common) and, 
internally, face aspects such as protectionism, 
inefficiency, and bureaucracy. Furthermore, as 
affiliates usually enjoy a favorable position in 
the internal market, this may discourage their 
drive for internationalization, as they may not 
attain a similar position in the international 
market (Pedersen & Stucchi, 2015). As such, the 
institutional characteristics of the home country 
may act as a demotivating factor in terms of the 
internationalization of group-affiliated firms. 
Furthermore, the advantages are related 
to the fact that family business groups are able 
to deal with the institutional breakdowns of 
home countries and, through this, have more 
experience in dealing with unstable institutional 
environments. In this regard, being part of a 
family business group provides the affiliate firm an 
advantage in comparison to all the other domestic 
firms, not only in contact with suppliers and 
distributors, but also due to the fact that family 
business groups have close ties to governmental 
agencies (Yaprak & Karademir, 2010). These 
groups have the power to influence politicians and 
may generate regulatory distortions for their own 
benefit (Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998). Becker-
Ritterspach and Bruche (2012) highlighted the 
central role of affiliation as a way to access internal 
and external resources and to develop capacities 
for the creation of internationally exploitable 
assets. In the case of groups that originate from 
emerging economies, Lin (2014) highlights the 
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relevance of their contacts with external markets. 
These contacts facilitate international expansion 
for affiliates, if compared to unaffiliated firms 
(Lamin, 2013). Moreover, sharing information 
and experiences stimulates learning and imitation 
among group firms and reduces uncertainty when 
it comes to unexplored markets (Borda-Reyes, 
2012). 
Thus, the support provided by the family 
business group in the internationalization of its 
affiliated firms, motivate them to internationalize 
faster, into a wider range of countries and 
with greater resource commitment, when 
compared to unaffiliated firms (Yaprak & 
Karademir, 2010). However, when institutional 
changes occur in the home country, the speed 
of the internationalization process may be 
negatively affected (Kumar, Stucchi, & Kundu, 
2012), that is, institutional factors directly 
impact the internationalization of affiliated 
firms. Regarding the commitment of resources 
, firms affiliated to a family business group tend to 
invest more resources in the home country than 
unaffiliated firms (Yaprak & Karademir, 2010). 
However, so far there is no accurate evidence 
about whether the existing difference between 
the institutional development of the host and 
the home country affects the commitment of 
resources of affiliated firms. Therefore, this is the 
theoretical gap that this article seeks to fill. 
2.2	 Host country selection based on 
institutional distance
According to institutional theory, the 
external context is responsible for dictating the 
rules of the game (North, 1990). The mechanisms 
that ensure compliance with these rules are the 
legislative, executive and judicial institutions, 
along with bureaucratic government issues, not to 
mention the obligation of fulfilling contracts and 
laws (Williamson, 2000). Through institutions it 
is possible to do business, secure agreements and 
resolve problems more efficiently. Institutions 
are composed of formal and informal rules. 
The formal rules are laws, the constitution and 
regulations. The informal rules are linked to 
people’s behavior, such as, for example, habits 
not specified accurately in the rules and laws 
(North, 1990). High quality institutions are 
necessary to economic growth, as they facilitate 
efficient operations among individuals and firms. 
In particular, institutional efficiency is a result of 
the coherent execution of regulations (La Porta 
et al., 1999) and tends to promote the firm’s good 
performance and export growth rates (LiPuma, 
Newbert, & Doh, 2013). In emerging markets, 
however, institutions are often weak, of poor quality 
and subject to legal, political, governmental, social 
and cultural, technological and security issues. 
As such, the domestic environment makes firms 
more selective when choosing their host countries 
(Mishra & Daly, 2007). Thus, institutional 
differences may influence the objective of firms’ 
internationalization (Moore, Payne, Bell, & 
Davis, 2015), as well as the entry mode in the new 
markets (Xu & Shenkar, 2002), the adoption of 
policies and practices (Kostova & Roth, 2002) and 
their performance (Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997).
One way to assess institutional differences 
is the institutional distance, which evaluates the 
differences or similarities between the home and 
the host country in terms of their institutional 
environments (Kostova, 1999). Generically 
speaking, institutional difference is the individual 
and collective difference among regulatory, 
normative and cognitive aspects of the home and 
host countries (Moore et al., 2015). Estimating 
this distance is important, as it permits to 
understand which entry mode strategy can be 
matched to the institutional distance, so as to 
guarantee a competitive edge to firms abroad 
(Hernandez & Nieto, 2015). Furthermore, 
through this measure, it is possible to analyze 
firms’ level of complexity in emerging markets, as 
institutions are usually weaker and more complex 
in said markets (Moore et al., 2015). In this sense, 
there is evidence that the greater the institutional 
distance, the more difficulty the foreign subsidiary 
will face in instituting legitimacy and transferring 
routines to its headquarters (Kostova & Zaheer, 
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1999). Xu and Shenkar (2002) proposed that 
multinationals choose less control over their 
subsidiaries abroad when the environment of 
the host country presents an institutional system 
that is very different from the home country, 
though they do choose majority control when 
the institutional system is similar. Another study 
showed that the probability of an investment in 
a greenfield-type expansion increases when the 
regulatory distance between countries is greater 
(Ionascu, Meyer, & Erstin, 2004). Thus, a larger 
institutional distance would discourage the entry 
of external capital, but the detrimental effect is 
mitigated if the host country holds substantial 
resources (Aleksynska & Havrylchyk, 2013). 
Hernandéz and Nieto (2015) showed that 
institutional distance has directions: negative 
distance, when a subsidiary is installed in a 
country with institutions that are worse than the 
home country; and positive distance, when the 
subsidiary is established in a country with better 
regulatory institutions than the home country. 
Thus, internationalization for countries with lower 
regulatory development levels is related to entry 
modes that require lesser resource development. 
Entry into countries with more elevated levels 
of regulatory development is related to the entry 
modes that calls for greater resource commitment 
(Hernandez & Nieto, 2015). Therefore, we 
suggest that the direction of institutional 
distance is important when deciding on resource 
commitment in international expansion. However, 
when the subsidiary of a multinational is affiliated 
to a family business group, what happens in 
relation to the commitment of resources and 
institutional distance? The previous studies did 
not show evidence of how family business groups 
internationalize in terms of institutional distance.
I t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o  n o t e  t h a t 
institutional issues may be determinant to the 
internationalization of family business groups, 
once affiliated firms incorporate the institutional 
characteristics of emerging markets. This may 
lead to a certain amount of difficulty in adapting 
to foreign markets, in the case of expanding into 
developed markets (Pedersen & Stucchi, 2015). 
Additionally, the fact that family business groups 
are able to cope with the institutional flaws of the 
home country means they have more experience in 
dealing with unstable institutional environments 
(Pedersen & Stucchi, 2015). Furthermore, there 
is evidence that family business groups influence 
national policy for their own benefit (Ghemawat 
& Khanna, 1998; Morck & Yeung, 2003). Thus, 
we propose that family business groups choose 
to commit more resources in countries with a 
negative institutional distance, as they have more 
experience in dealing with volatile institutional 
environments, similar to those in their home 
countries. Consequently, family business groups 
will commit fewer resources in countries with a 
positive institutional distance, that is, countries 
that are more institutionally developed, since 
their affiliates incorporate the characteristics of 
the domestic market and face difficulty in dealing 
with more developed markets. 
Thus, we understood that the choice 
of the host country in terms of institutional 
distance is relevant to the internationalization 
of family business groups. What antecedes this 
choice is the level of resource commitment 
that the group-affiliated firm will hold in its 
international expansion, which may be in the 
form of a commercial office, meaning low resource 
commitment, or even a manufacturing plant, 
meaning high resource commitment. 
2.3	Hypothesis development
Family business groups are more common 
in emerging markets (Khanna & Palepu, 2000a). 
They develop and grow due to the institutional 
flaws of the home country (Khanna & Palepu, 
2000a) and transact among group-affiliated firms, 
whenever this is most advantages in terms of 
transactions costs (Williamson, 1981). Affiliated 
firms internationalize with advantages in relation 
to unaffiliated firms, as they receive support from 
the connections the family business group has with 
governments, banks and institutions (Pedersen & 
Stucchi, 2015). In addition, as institutions play a 
relevant role in the establishment and development 
of family business groups; affiliated firms are 
marked by the institutional characteristics of the 
home country, such as, for example, protectionism, 
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inefficiency and bureaucracy. All the same, as they 
occupy a favorable position within the market, 
they may be less motivated to internationalize 
to countries very different in institutional terms 
(Pedersen & Stucchi, 2015). Therefore, it is 
proposed that family business groups choose to 
internationalize to institutionally more distant 
countries with less resource commitment as a way 
to learn about that institutional environment. 
However, through this approach they become less 
exposed to risk by committing resources, as they 
do not develop sufficient skills to deal with more 
developed institutional environments. In this 
way, the group faces greater difficulty in making 
connections with governments, gaining access to 
financing and forming relationships with local 
institutions, as they differ greatly to the reality of 
the home country. Thus, we propose the following 
hypothesis
H1: A lower degree of resource commitment 
in the internationalization of a family 
business group is positively associated to the 
institutional distance between home and 
host countries.
As the institutional issue is relevant in 
the configuration and growth of family business 
groups, the firms affiliated to these groups deal 
with a financial sector lacking transparency, with 
the regulation of underdeveloped countries, with 
weak commitment to fulfilling contracts and 
failure to comply with local laws (Khanna & 
Palepu, 2000a). As a result, a weak institutional 
context induces family business groups to 
create a market within the actual group, grow 
and diversify in environments with inadequate 
institutional development. Being part of a family 
business group thus creates a competitive edge 
for the affiliate firm, as the groups usually have 
an influence on policy and are proficient in 
dealing with volatile institutional environments. 
As such, we propose that family business groups 
chose to internationalize with greater resource 
commitment to countries with a negative 
institutional distance in relation to home 
countries, that is, to less institutionally developed 
countries, as they find it easier to deal with the 
institutions of that country, seeing as though they 
already do so efficiently in their home countries. 
Thus, we propose the following hypothesis:
H2: A higher degree of resource commitment 
in the internationalization of a family 
business group is negatively associated to the 
institutional distance between home and 
host countries.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between 
the variables proposed in hypotheses 1 and 2. 
Figure 1: Model of the relationship among variables
Source: authors.
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3	 Methods
3.1	Data
Collecting data on family business group 
internationalization to test our hypothesis was 
a major challenge in Brazil, as the information 
on business group affiliated firms is difficult to 
obtain. In this article, data was collected through 
multiple sources, in order to guarantee access to 
the volume and quality necessary to test models on 
an unprecedented longitudinal database, thereby 
constructing a panel database. A longitudinal of 
data offers better estimators, as it provides insight 
on how the phenomenon behaves over time. Also, 
firms tend to internationalize year after year (often 
with more than one international expansion per 
year) and, thus, longitudinal data can offer better 
explanations to the proposed models. 
Regarding the data of Brazilian family 
business groups, we collected through Valor 
Grande Grupos. Data was captured from the 
2001 to 2011 editions, a period that historically 
represents an intensive internationalization 
process among Brazilian firms, due to a series of 
promarket reforms and favorable international 
conditions. The publication ranks the top 200 
Brazilian business groups. The group’s gross 
earnings are used for the rank selection format. 
Valor Grandes Groups is an annual publication 
available on the newspaper Valor Econômico, 
Brazil’s leading periodical on business and finance. 
Information gathered from Valor Grandes Grupos 
has previously been used in other academic studies 
(Aldrighi & Postali, 2010; Costa et al., 2013; 
Xavier, Marcon, & Bandeira-de-Mello, 2013). 
Data showed that, among the top 200 Brazilian 
business groups, only 38 run foreign operations. 
In the period from 2001 to 2011, these 38 
internationalized family business groups were 
responsible for establishing 541 affiliated firms 
abroad, in over 50 different countries. 
Besides the annual publication of Valor 
Grandes Grupos, the sample was selected from 
a collection of secondary data sources. Among 
these sources are: (i) Orbis Database – through 
which it was possible to access each group and 
verify their international activities (whether they 
ran foreign operations and information about 
the international subsidiary); (ii) the websites 
of each family business group – from where 
we gathered information regarding the group’s 
history and decisions on internationalization 
(iii) Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) – A 
World Bank database, providing information on 
the institutional development of the countries 
analyzed. It is important to note that researchers 
from different fields, such as Economics, Political 
and Social Sciences, have diverging philosophies 
and concepts regarding the institutional 
environment and, as such, they attribute different 
values to the range of components that form the 
concept of institutions (Mudambi & Navarra, 
2002). In this study, we used the governance 
indicators obtained from Worldwide Governance 
Indicators to show the institutional development 
of a country. In total, there are six key dimensions 
of governance published each year through WGI 
for a list of 215 countries, and which will be 
explained further on. Finally, the last data source 
was (v) Economatica – which provided information 
about diversification, accounting and financial 
information. The final sample is comprised of 361 
observations, approximately 33 groups per year, 
given that some groups may have formed after 
2001 or terminated their operations prior to 2011. 
As each group likely has more than one affiliated 
form abroad per year, this explains the reasons 
why the number of observations is less than the 
number of foreign affiliated firms. The idea was to 
quantify the structure of family business groups in 
the host country, by the number of foreign affiliated 
firms and the type of foreign affiliated form – 
manufacture, financial institution, distribution 
centers and commercial offices. Thus, the study’s 
unit of analysis is the group and its structure and 
not the subsidiary alone. 
3.2	Variables
3.2.1	Dependent variable
This article considers the institutional 
distance between Brazil and the countries where 
family business groups have affiliates as being a 
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dependent variable. All the information relative 
to the perception of the institutional quality of 
the countries was collected from World Bank 
data using the so-called Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI). The database offers a ranking 
on the perceived institutional quality of countries. 
Position of each nation corresponds to the 
percentile at which the country is found among 
215 others studied by the World Bank, on 
a scale that varies from 0 to 100. Brazil has 
usually featured between 40 and 60 over the 
years of research, based on a series of assessment 
dimensions. For example, if in a given year Brazil 
features at 45.03, this means that the country 
presents greater institutional development than 
45.03% of the countries in the database. Thus, 
by knowing the position of each country, it is 
possible to calculate the distance between them 
and Brazil. The formula is presented as follows:
Institutional Distance = [Ranking of host countries] 
– [Brazil Ranking]
This simple subtraction is able to determine 
the distance (in positions) between Brazil and the 
other countries. Positive institutional distance 
values indicate that the foreign affiliated firm 
was set up in a country with institutions better 
developed than the Brazilian ones. For example, 
an institutional distance of +40.02 indicates that 
the affiliated firm is hosted in country ranked 
42.02% higher than Brazil indicting more 
developed institutions. In the case of multiple 
foreign affiliated firms established in the same year, 
an average was used for the group’s institutional 
distance in that year (adding the positions of the 
countries and dividing the total by the number 
of foreign affiliated firms). 
WGIs indicators are composed by six 
dimensions on the perception of institutional 
quality. It is worth reiterating that all these 
indicators are related to the country’s governance: 
(i) Voice and Accountability: reflects the 
perception of amplitude that a citizen 
of the country has to participate in the 
selection of his/her government, as well 
as the freedom of expression, freedom of 
association and freedom of the press; 
(ii) Political Stability and Absence of Violence/
Terrorism: Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions 
of the likelihood of political instability 
and/or politically motivated violence, 
including terrorism;
(iii) Government Effectiveness: measures the 
quality of public services, the quality of 
the civil service and its independence 
from political pressures, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, 
and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to its stated policies;
(iv) Regulatory Quality: captures perceptions 
of the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies 
and regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development. 
(v) Rule of Law: This indicator measures the 
extent to which individuals and firms 
have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society; in particular, it measures 
the functioning and independence of 
the judiciary, including the police, the 
protection of property rights, the quality 
of contract enforcement, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence;
(vi) Control of Corruption: This indicator 
measures the extent to which public power 
is exercised for private grain, including 
both petty and grand forms of corruption, 
as well as “capture” of the state by elites 
and private interests. 
All these indicators were grouped in a 
single factor, treated as the Mean Institutional 
Distance, represented by the simple arithmetic 
average of the values of each of the previous 
indicators, per country and per year. Due to issues 
of robustness, tests were also undertaken for each 
of the indicators individually. For each of the six 
indicators reported by the World Bank, Brazil 
tends to occupy positions close to the middle, 
in the period between 2000 and 2011. Below 
Brazil are the countries with negative institutional 
distances, ranked with less develop institutions, 
and above Brazil are those nations with positive 
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institutional distances, a group composed by 
more developed institutions. The fact that Brazil’s 
indexes are close to the middle makes it an 
especially interesting option for the application of 
this study, as the number of countries with more 
or less developed countries tends to be equivalent.
The models  in this  ar t ic le  were 
operationalized in accordance with each of the 
WGIs, in order to determine whether the decision 
to internationalize Brazilian family groups has 
a relevant association on measuring the Mean 
Institutional Distance. Model 1.1 to 1.6 consider 
the Mean Institutional Distance as a dependent 
variable. Models 2.1 to 2.6 consider each of 
the six WGIs as dependent variables. Tests with 
disaggregate dependent variables contribute to the 
robustness of results found in models 1.1 to 1.6, 
since they identify the aggregate and individual 
effect found.
3.2.2	Independent variable
3.2.2.1 Type of affiliated firm in the host 
country
Hypotheses 1 and 2 tests are related to 
the type of affiliate firm installed in the host 
country. As such, foreign affiliated firms were 
characterized as: (i) manufacturing plants and (ii) 
commercial offices. These variables were captured 
through the corporate group websites, Orbis and 
the Valor Grandes Grupos annual publication. 
They were measured using the total number 
of foreign affiliated firms that family business 
groups establish in each category (manufacturing 
plant and commercial office) per year. Through 
this variable, it is possible to capture the affiliate 
firm’s degree of resource commitment in its 
internationalization.
3.2.2.2 Number of foreign affiliated firms
Through using the number of its 
subsidiaries, it is possible to measure how the 
internationalization process of a family business 
group occurs. Data was thus collected on the 
number of affiliated firms in different host 
countries, using databases such as: (i) Orbis; 
(ii) corporate group websites; (iii) statements 
and publications by the firm. This variable was 
employed in certain studies for example, in Dau 
(2012), who used it to measure the number of 
foreign subsidiaries held by the firms. 
In total, data was obtained on 81 different 
countries, representing 541 foreign affiliated 
firms. According to the presented theoretical 
model, it is expected that the number of foreign 
affiliated firms linked to Brazilian family business 
groups can explain greater institutional distances 
adopted by new foreign affiliated firms.
3.2.3	Control variables
3.2.3.1 Diversification
Diversification was gauged using market 
indicators from the Economatica database, 
taking from it sectoral information with 55 
levels of classification, used by the Brazilian 
Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). 
Each of the firms affiliated to the corporate 
groups was analyzed, based on Valor Grandes 
Grupos, and classified in 33 different sectors. The 
diversification variable is considered one of the 
leading characteristics of family business groups 
and, as such, control of it is considered important 
(Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998; Khanna & Yafet, 
2005; Costa et al. 2013).
3.2.3.2 Vertical integration
The same classification used by the IBGE 
was used to calculate vertical integration followed 
by the article by Khanna and Yafet (2005) and 
also the proxy generated by the work of Costa, 
Bandeira-de-Mello and Marcon (2013). To 
achieve this, an intra-sectoral technical coefficient 
matrix was used, representing production values 
in Brazil, activity by activity. Using this table, 
sectors were identified, along with which groups 
belong to each sector (55 levels). The vertical 
integration variable is considered one of the 
leading characteristics of family business groups 
and, as such, control of it is considered important 
337
Review of Business Management., São Paulo, Vol. 18, No. 61, p. 327-347,  Jul./Sept. 2016
Business groups internationalization: choosing a host country according to institutional distance
(Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998; Khanna & Yafet, 
2005; Costa et al. 2013).
3.2.3.3 Revenue
In this variable, we considered the total 
gross annual revenue for each family business 
group. The Total Assets and Net Profit were 
also tested, although these variables present 
expressive multicollinearity with diversification. 
Lastly, models were tested that use revenue as 
representative of the size of the family business 
group (variable transformed into a logarithm). This 
variable is used to control the size of the family 
business group and is commonly used in strategy 
studies (Inoue, Lazzarini, & Musacchio, 2013).
3.3 Analysis procedures and model 
specification
Using data descriptive statistics, we 
assessed information such as: the main destination 
for international expansion by business groups 
and the type of affiliated firm established abroad. 
This information was important to understand 
these groups’ extension and the type of investment 
they are looking for in those particular countries. 
Following this phase, the correlation matrix was 
studied for each of the main variables. Results 
are presented in Table 2. The correlation matrix 
helps prevent the presence of variables with 
elevated correlation coefficients (>0.70), which 
may lead to problems such as multicollinearity 
and estimation errors. 
Both hypotheses, 1 and 2, were tested 
through the use of multiple linear regression, 
in a non-observable and fixed effects model. 
We understand that the choice seeks to control 
non-observable variables and non-observable 
heterogeneities (Allison, 2009), even though it is 
not able to control the non-observable variables 
that present change over time. As such, fixed effects 
help control all the non-observable variables that 
remain unchanged over time, such as the year of 
establishment, sector and specific characteristics of 
the firm. Multiple linear regression represents an 
important tool for testing covariance among the 
variables that, in some cases, may be interpreted 
as causal effects. In the procedures and outline of 
this study, we attempted to develop tests in a way 
to optimize the possibility of finding causal effects 
in the coefficients. However, it is understood 
that these variables may present correlation 
with the term of error, generated due problems 
in endogeneity, for example. The final model is 
presented by:
In this equation,  means the Institutional 
distance of the affiliated firm established in a 
foreign country compared to Brazil (whether 
the average or any of the six indicators that 
comprise the WGI base). Models 1.1 to 1.6 use 
the mean institutional distance as a dependent 
variable, while models 2.1 to 2.6 use each of the 
six variables measured by WGIs. The  variable 
represents the number of foreign affiliated firms 
per family business group. The  variable represents 
the type of established affiliated firm and, lastly, 
refers to the controls added to the models.
Robust coefficients for estimators were used 
to control heteroscedasticity. Multicollinearity was 
analyzed through the Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) and cases in which the VIF exceeded a 5.00 
value were eliminated. Finally, the residues of each 
of the models were analyzed, seeking evidence of 
non-linearity. All models were tested with the help 
of Stata MP 13.1 software.
4	Results
Presenting a summarized look at the data, 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the 
variables used in this article. Even though many 
of the variables present 428 observations (8 groups 
over 11 years), the models present a total 362 
valid cases. This reduction is due to the lack of 
information for certain years and family business 
groups analyzed. It is worth noting that, among 
all the institutional distance variables (average and 
individually in the six indicators), the minimum 
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value was -56, while the maximum was +61. As 
previously reported, the outreach of distance in 
the WGI variable ranges between 0 and 100. 
However, in the majority of cases, Brazil presented 
numbers close to 45 and 55. Thus, values found 
between -56 and +61 were unsurprising. Table 1 
presents longitudinal averages, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum values, asymmetry and 
kurtosis of the variables discussed earlier.
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics
  Variable Notes Average Standard Dev. Min Max Asymmetry Kurtosis
(1) Mean Institutional Distance 428 3.2590 13.8653 -45.6558 46.9529 0.8586 4.8704
(2) Control of Corruption 428 2.1546 14.7693 -56.0976 47.3171 0.2844 5.1674
(3) Rule of Law 428 5.2974 17.1597 -53.5545 61.7225 1.3256 5.1022
(4) Regulatory Quality 428 2.7625 14.8447 -51.1962 45.0980 0.2717 5.3618
(5) Government Effectiveness 428 4.8512 14.4165 -48.2927 48.5366 0.8078 5.2347
(6) Political Stability 428 3.8014 14.7461 -52.4038 57.6923 1.1427 6.0575
(7) Voice and Accountability 428 0.6867 14.2166 -56.8075 44.9519 -0.6368 7.6913
(8) Num. of foreign affiliated firms. 428 0.8224 1.9897 0.0000 27.0000 7.0110 78.7697
(9) Manufacturing 428 0.3621 1.1087 0.0000 13.0000 6.7140 64.4933
(10) Commercial 428 0.1192 0.4665 0.0000 5.0000 5.5213 42.2839
(11) Diversification 363 1.4973 0.7432 0.0000 3.1355 -0.3662 2.5519
(12) Vertical Integration 363 0.2881 1.6039 -3.9391 5.3091 0.2101 3.3169
(13) Revenue 377 8.6704 1.4091 5.7491 12.6321 0.3964 2.5667
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix. 
Data shows a strong and significant correlation 
among all the institutional distance variables 
(Table 2, lines 1 to 7), with β > 0.66 (p<0.05), 
which permits aggregate treatment. Following the 
idea that the number of foreign affiliated firms 
shows a consistent and positive relation with 
institutional distance, the coefficients of Table 2 
(line 8) present values that are in accordance with 
expectations. The same consistency is found as to 
commercial office-type affiliated firms, referring 
to hypothesis 1 (Table 2 line 10). Institutional 
distance associating manufacturing plant-type 
affiliated firms did not present a significant initial 
relationship (Table 2, Line 9: p<0.05). Both 
diversification and vertical integration variables 
presented a significant and negative correlation 
(Table 2, line 12: p<0.05) and are positively 
related to the revenue variable. Independent 
variables do not present a relevant significant 
relationship, which is an important condition in 
avoiding multicollinearity. 
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The hypotheses tested the relationship 
between the commitment of resources by 
family group-affiliated firms and the choice of 
host country in terms of institutional distance. 
To test these hypotheses, Table 3 used the 
mean institutional distance as a dependent 
variable, considering that aggregation of the six 
WGIs in a single variable and then calculating 
the actual distances between Brazil’s position 
and the numbers presented by host nations. 
Hypothesis 1 suggests that a commercial office 
affiliated firm, which expends fewer resources, 
is positively correlated to the choice of the host 
country measured by institutional distance. 
And hypothesis 2 states the contrary effect, with 
regards to manufacturing-type affiliated firms, 
which commit greater resources. 
Table 3 
Regression of models 1.1 to 1.6
Model
Mean Institutional Distance
Model 1.1 Model 1.2 Model 1.3 Model 1.4 Model 1.5 Model 1.6
Num of foreign affiliated firms. 0,616 0,769 1,103** 1,071**
(0,406) (0,531) (0,467) (0,463)
Manufature -0,167 -1,483* -1,997*** -1,966***
(0,561) (0,855) (0,711) (0,713)
Commercial 6,193*** 5,709*** 4,906** 4,973**
(1,781) (1,877) (2,038) (2,054)
Diversification -0,200 0,0417
(2,671) (2,516)
Vertical Integration -0,361 -0,189
(0,906) (0,926)




Constante 2,752*** 3,320*** 2,521*** 2,484*** 2,618 8,083
(0,334) (0,203) (0,212) (0,286) (4,258) (11,30)
Notes 428 428 428 428 363 361
R-squared 0,008 0,000 0,041 0,049 0,049 0,049
Number of Groups 39 39 39 39 38 38
EF firms YES YES YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses, Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Hypothesis H1 is supported both by the 
evidence noted in Model 1.3 (Table 3: β = 6.193, 
p<0.01), when controlled for other variables (such 
as the number of foreign affiliated firms and 
revenue). The coefficient maintains its properties 
with a slight downturn in its explanatory power 
(Table 3. Model 1.6: β = 4.973, p<0.05). 
Consequently, tests suggest that the less resource 
commitment – opening a commercial office in 
the host country – is positively associated to the 
commercial distance between the home and host 
countries, in support of hypothesis H1. In other 
words, it suggests that Brazilian family business 
groups internationalize to developed countries 
by means of commercial offices, since risk and 
investment are lower, and the institutional 
environment is different from that of group-
affiliated firms. 
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Hypothes i s  H2 argues  tha t  the 
higher commitment of resources – opening a 
manufacturing plant in the host country – is 
negatively associated to the institutional distance 
between the home and host nations. In the case of 
foreign affiliated firms, the simple linear regression 
test found no statistical significance (Table 3. 
Model 1.2: β = -0.167, p<0.05). However, when 
control variables are used, the foreign affiliated 
firms of the manufacturing plant type present 
both negative and significant effects. Model 1.6: 
β = -1.966, p<0.01; Table 3. Model 1.5: β = -1.997, 
p<0.01). In short, these results suggest that, when 
the institutional distance between Brazil and the 
host country is negative (indicating countries 
with less developed institutions), Brazilian family 
business groups tend to internationalize through 
affiliated manufacturing plants. These results 
provide support to hypothesis H2. That is, there 
is greater motivation to internationalize when host 
country institutions are less developed than those 
of the home country. 
Furthermore, the variable for the number 
of foreign affiliated firms presents a non-
significant relation in the simple linear model 
(Table 3. Model 1.1: β = 0.616, p<0.05). When 
the diversification and revenue control variables 
are used, the test reports a positive and significant 
coefficient (Table 3. Model 1.6: β = 1.1071, 
p<0.05). This result shows that the number of 
foreign affiliated firms is positively related to the 
institutional distance. In sum, an increase in the 
number of foreign affiliated firms allows family 
business groups to turn to countries with higher 
institutional development than the home country. 
To avoid problems arising from aggregate 
variables, such as mean institutional distance used 
in models 1.1 to 1.6, we opted for a series of 
robustness tests using each of the six WGIs. Thus, 
instead of using the mean institutional distances 
among the rankings for each of the countries 
and for each of the WGIs reported (Table 4). As 
such, the tests related to the following models: 
Control of Corruption (Model 2.1), Rule of Law 
(Model 2.2), Regulatory Quality (Model 2.3), 
Government Effectiveness (Model 2.4), Political 
Stability (Model 2.5), Voice and Accountability 
(Model 2.6). Testing the indicators individually 
is an attempt to reinforce the explanatory power 
of the model found. Once again, hypotheses 1 
and 2 found support for the majority of cases 
tested. Hypothesis H1 was fully supports (Table 
4. Models 2.1 to 2.6), while hypothesis H2 found 
support in four out of the six dimensions (Table 
4. Models 2.1 to 2.3 and Model 2.5). 
These results allowed us to advance with 
the existing theory on the internationalization of 
family business groups. Earlier evidence suggests 
that group-affiliated firms invest more resources in 
host countries than unaffiliated firms. Our results 
showed that, depending on the institutional 
distance between the home and host countries, 
the commitment of invested resources may be 
higher or lower. 
Regarding the support of hypothesis 
H1, we can infer that family business groups 
internationalize with less resource commitment, 
that is, through commercial offices, to countries 
with higher institutional development than found 
in the home country. This result complies with 
the findings by Hernandez and Nieto (2015), who 
affirmed that, the more positive the institutional 
distance the higher the commitment in the host 
country. However, the study by these authors 
looked at firms unaffiliated to family business 
groups. In the case of family business groups, 
literature shows that, because affiliated firms 
have deep-rooted characteristics from their home 
countries (Pedersen & Stucchi, 2015) and the 
majority of them are from countries that face 
weak institutional development (Khanna & 
Palepu, 2000b; Morck & Yeung, 2003), they run 
a higher risk by committing resources, since they 
have not developed sufficient competencies to deal 
with more developed institutional environments. 
Based on this result, we may corroborate what 
was proposed by Kostova and Zaheer (1999). 
According to the authors, the greater the 
institutional distance between countries, the more 
difficult it will be, for subsidiaries, to impress their 
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legitimacy and transfer routines between the home 
and host countries. Incompatibility between 
family group-affiliated firms and countries with 
more developed institutional environments 
leads to greater risk and uncertainty for affiliates, 
essentially resulting from a lack of knowledge 
on how to cope within a different institutional 
environment (Berry, 2006).
Table 4 
Regression of models 2.1 to 2.6
Model
CofCor RuOfLw RegQlt GofEff PolSta VoAcco
Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3 Model 2.4 Model 2.5 Model 2.6
Num of foreign affiliated 
firms. 0.807 1.778** 1.033** 1.382** 1.442** -0.0166
(0.491) (0.663) (0.488) (0.590) (0.643) (0.526)
Manufacture -2.320*** -2.894*** -2.319** -1.465 -1.761** -1.035
(0.785) (0.921) (0.873) (0.953) (0.833) (0.800)
Commercial 4.000** 6.552*** 5.293** 4.415* 4.844** 4.735**
(1.926) (2.110) (2.579) (2.273) (2.070) (2.057)
Diversification -0.768 -0.769 -0.820 1.645 -1.156 2.118
(2.773) (2.772) (2.398) (2.113) (2.899) (3.394)
Vertical Integration -0.521 -0.173 -0.391 -0.0217 -0.314 0.284
(1.051) (1.043) (0.999) (0.872) (0.957) (1.227)
Interaction # (Div#Int) -0.00257 0.00803 0.00712 0.00760 0.0204 -0.00258
(0.0156) (0.0140) (0.0133) (0.00945) (0.0161) (0.0249)
Revenue -0.789 -2.145 1.660 1.397 -0.995 -3.222**
(1.265) (1.364) (1.178) (1.067) (1.481) (1.432)
Constant 9.890 23.49* -11.01 -10.97 12.46 24.64*
(12.15) (12.99) (10.74) (10.09) (14.82) (12.59)
Notes 361 361 361 361 361 361
R-squared 0.034 0.073 0.050 0.062 0.059 0.037
Number of Groups 38 38 38 38 38 38
EF firm YES YES YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses, Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Through the support of hypothesis 
H2, it is possible to infer that family business 
groups internationalize with greater resource 
commitment, that is, through manufacturing 
plants, to countries with lower institutional 
development than that found in the home country. 
There is evidence that a negative institutional 
distance between home and host countries leads 
to foreign firms making a lesser commitment in 
the host country (Hernandez & Nieto, 2015). 
However, in the case of family business groups, 
we may infer that the opposite is true, since the 
groups are well-versed in unstable institutional 
environments, as developed in countries with 
weak institutions (Khanna & Palepu, 2000; 
Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998). Guillén (2000) and 
Khanna and Palepu (2000a) suggest that family 
business groups could exist in the absence of 
developed markets since, in essence, that happens 
to give their affiliates the opportunity to operate in 
imperfect markets in terms of capital, production, 
work and technology. Markets with high levels of 
corruption (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008) are subject 
to unexpected changes in governmental policies 
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and government intervention in private business 
(Slangen & Tulder, 2009). However, family 
business groups have the competitive edge of 
close political connections and, through these, 
are able to influence home country’s policies 
(Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998; Morck & Yeung, 
2003; Morck, 2010; Schneider, 2009). Thus, a 
good understanding of less developed institutions 
increases the perception of difficulties in the host 
country and aids the development of the affiliated 
firm in that country (Håkanson & Ambos, 2010). 
Consequentially, it is easier for group-affiliated 
firms to access less institutionally developed 
countries, since family business groups have the 
necessary set of skills to deal with less developed 
institutions (Pedersen & Stucchi, 2015). With 
the lower risk of failure, they choose greater 
investments. 
Moreover, it was possible to verify the 
knowledge developed over the years in relation 
to the internationalization of firms affiliated to 
family business groups. There is evidence showing 
that, as family business groups increase their 
number of foreign affiliates, there is a greater 
trend for them to enter countries with a positive 
institutional distance, in other words, more 
developed than the home country. The results 
found in this study corroborate to what was 
proposed by Borda-Reyes (2012): the exchange 
of experience and information among firms part 
of family business groups stimulates learning 
and reduces uncertainty in unexplored markets 
(Borda-Reyes, 2012). Groups gain international 
experience through their affiliated firms and this 
ends up being an important resource in expanding 
internationally (Yang, Jiang, Kang, & Ke, 2009). 
5	 Conclusion
Our results contribute to extent the 
knowledge on the literature about family business 
groups. Previous studies showed that business 
groups invest more resources in the host country, 
when compared to group-unaffiliated firms 
(Yaprak & Karademir, 2010). However, this 
article challenged that notion and shows that the 
decision to commit greater (manufacturing plant) 
or lesser (commercial office) resources is related 
to the institutional distance between the home 
and host countries. Therefore, in international 
expansion, the decision by affiliates to open a 
commercial office is associated to the fact that 
the host country presents a positive institutional 
distance, when compared to the home country. 
We believe this happens due to the fact that 
the institutional characteristics of the home 
country, in this case Brazil, are less developed 
than the characteristics of the host country. 
Thus, incompatibility with a more developed 
institutional environment produces higher risk 
and uncertainty for affiliates, which is essentially 
the result of a lack of understanding when it comes 
to dealing with more developed institutional 
environments (Berry, 2006). As such, when 
affiliated firms decide to expand internationally, 
the investment takes the form of a manufacturing 
plant and there is a trend to choose a host 
country with less developed institutions than 
those of the home country, that is, with negative 
institutional distances. This is due to the groups 
coping well with relatively unstable institutional 
environments, since they develop essentially in 
countries with weaker institutions (Ghemawat 
& Khanna, 1998; Khanna & Palepu, 2000a). 
In addition, group-affiliated firms have deep-
rooted characteristics typical to the home market, 
which bolsters their development in markets with 
weaker institutions (Pedersen & Stucchi, 2015). 
Lastly, when less developed institutions are better 
understood, difficulties are reduced in the host 
country, helping the affiliated firms to develop in 
that country (Håkanson & Ambos, 2010).
5.1	Limitations and future studies
This study was unsuccessful to cover 
certain aspects that deserve attention in future 
studies. For example, the fact that only 38 of 
the top 200 Brazilian groups have international 
operations. This issue can be addressed in both 
theoretical and empirical terms. Furthermore, it 
is important to analyze the time that lapses until 
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a group-affiliated firm internationalizes, to thus 
use the family business group’s date of foundation 
versus the date of its first international activity. 
Also, in to what extent political variables affect 
the type of investment (commercial office and 
manufacturing plant) in the host country, using 
data collected on political connection and tests 
conducted on measuring this variable in relation 
to the commitment of resources and institutional 
distance. Although this study contributed to 
understand the internationalization of family 
business groups, we believe that future studies 
could enhance it through enlarge the database 
including other countries, and providing a wider 
analysis of the subject. Lastly, with a larger sample, 
perhaps it would be possible to use more accurate 
statistical methods, which can check the causality 
among variables. 
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